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Abstract  Although East Asian countries were relatively inactive in signing free trade agreements 
(FTAs) until the end of 1990s, a number of FTAs involving East Asian countries have been 
signed since the turn of the century. The objective of this study is to compare welfare gains and 
sectoral adjustments resulting from various FTA scenarios in East Asia using a dynamic global 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The RCA rankings of commodities with various 
FTA scenarios and those with the global trade liberalization are correlated to examine how 
“natural” each grouping would be. The results suggest that the ASEAN+3 FTA, with relatively 
large welfare gains and small structural adjustments, could be a facilitating intermediate step 
towards global free trade. Some of the smaller FTAs, such as the ASEAN-China and ASEAN-
Korea FTAs, would result in large structural adjustments for ASEAN countries. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In the past two decades the number of free trade agreements (FTAs) has proliferated rapidly. 
Other than ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), East Asian countries were relatively inactive 
in signing FTAs until the end of 1990s. Since the turn of the century, however, a number of FTAs 
involving East Asian countries have been implemented or signed, including, Japan-Singapore 
(2002), Singapore-Australia (2003), Singapore-U.S. (2004), Korea-Chile (2004), ASEAN-China 
(2005), Japan-Mexico (2005), Thailand-Australia (2005), ASEAN-Korea (2006), Japan-Thailand 
(2007), and Japan-Indonesia (2007). Korea and the United Stated signed an FTA in April 2007, 
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but it remains to be seen whether the U.S. Congress and the Korean National Assembly would 
ratify the bilateral pact. A large number of FTAs are currently being negotiated in East Asia, 
including ASEAN-Japan, Australia-China, Australia-Japan, and Japan-Korea. The ASEAN+3 
group, consisting of the ASEAN countries, China, Japan, and Korea, has provided an effective 
mechanism for greater cooperation and gradual regional economic integration in East Asia. The 
trends in negotiating for new FTAs are growing in East Asia.1 
 
Whether the growth of FTAs has a positive or negative impact on multilateral trade 
liberalization under the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been debated intensely (e.g., 
Krueger, 1999; Panagariya, 2000; Lloyd and MacLaren, 2004).2 Since the outcome depends upon 
the choice of the objective function (e.g. economic welfare versus political objective), the height 
and structure of initial trade barriers and other variables,3 it would be helpful to examine the actual 
record. The earlier studies (e.g., World Trade Organization, 1995; World Bank, 2000) suggest that 
the proliferation of regional integration agreements (RIAs) did not delay multilateral liberalization. 
However, Lloyd and MacLaren (2004) point out that after the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Cancún in September 2003, the United States and the EU’s priority has shifted to the completion 
of bilateral and regional trade negotiations. Thus, the relationship between the growth of RIAs and 
multilateral liberalization might have changed. 
 
A number of studies have quantified the effects of various FTAs in East Asia using a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model (e.g., Brown et al., 2003; Dee, 2007; Lee et al., 
2004; Park, 2006; Scollay and Gilbert, 2001; Urata and Kiyota, 2003; Zhai, 2006). These studies 
generally find: (1) most of the FTA members’ real income increases while at least some of non-
members’ real income declines; (2) the larger the economic size of the FTA, the larger the 
aggregate gain to the members; (3) if FTAs are confined to only tariff liberalization for 
merchandize trade, the welfare gains are limited and some of the members are more likely to 
become worse off; (4) when FTAs include services trade liberalization and trade facilitation, the 
gain to each member increases and the aggregate loss to non-members decreases; (5) the impact 
of FTAs becomes greater when the model incorporates increasing returns to scale and imperfect 
competition in at least some of the industries; and (6) the effects of FTAs tend to become more 
beneficial with the model incorporating investment and growth effects. 
 
While the aggregate welfare effect of FTAs is certainly important, the sectoral impact could 
be of an even greater concern to policy makers. This is because regional integration might lead to 
a sharp contraction of output and employment in highly protected sectors. For example, the 
agricultural sectors in Japan and Korea are highly subsidized and shielded against foreign imports 
by significant tariffs and nontariff barriers. In a number of developing members, tariffs, industrial 
policy, and other government policies protect certain manufacturing industries from foreign 
competition. Since trade policy is often formulated from the bottom up, a modern view of national 
interest, such as that based on trade reciprocity, might encounter conflicts with established 
domestic interests. 
 
Using a dynamic global CGE model, we evaluate the effects of various free trade agreements 
involving East Asian countries, emphasizing sectoral adjustments and changes in the pattern of 
trade resulting from the formation of FTAs. The next section gives an overview of the model. 
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Section 3 provides a brief description of the baseline and policy scenarios, followed by 
assessments of computational results in section 4. The final section summarizes the main policy 
conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Overview of the Model 
 
The model used in this study, known as the LINKAGE model, is a dynamic global CGE model 
developed by van der Mensbrugghe (2005). It spans the period 2001-2015 and all sectors are 
assumed to be perfectly competitive and operate under constant returns to scale.4 Production in 
each sector is modeled by a series of nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production 
functions, which are intended to represent the different substitution and complementarity relations 
across the various inputs in each sector. Labor can have three different skill levels: unskilled, 
skilled, and highly skilled. The first two are substitutable and combined in a CES aggregation 
function as a single labor bundle. Highly skilled labor is combined with capital to form a physical 
plus human capital bundle. 
 
Dynamics in this model is recursive. Population and labor supply growth are exogenous. 
Capital accumulation is based on past savings and investment. In each period the supply of 
primary factors is generally predetermined. The supply of land is assumed to be sensitive to the 
contemporaneous price of land, however. Land is assumed to be partially mobile across 
agricultural sectors. Thus rates of return are sector-specific, but sectoral land supply reacts to 
changes in relative rates of return. Some of the natural resource sectors also have a sector-specific 
factor whose contemporaneous supply is price sensitive. The model incorporates a vintage 
structure for capital that allows for adjustment costs. New capital is assumed to be perfectly 
mobile across sectors, whereas installed capital is only partially mobile. All else equal, countries 
with higher savings rates will have more ‘flexible’ capital since it is assumed that substitution 
elasticities are higher with new capital than with installed capital. Labor within each skill category 
is perfectly mobile across sectors. 
 
Factor income accrues to a single representative household, which finances government 
expenditures (through direct and indirect taxes) and investment (through domestic savings). 
Domestic savings may be augmented or diminished by a net capital flow. In the current version of 
the model, the latter is exogenous in any given time period for each region, thereby generating a 
fixed current account balance. Ex ante shocks to the current account—e.g., a reduction in trade 
barriers—induces a change in the real exchange rate. Government fiscal balances are also fixed in 
each time period, and the equilibrating mechanism is lump-sum taxes on the representative 
household. For example, a reduction in tariff revenue is compensated by an increase in household 
direct taxation.  
 
The basic assumption on trade is that imports originating in different regions are imperfect 
substitutes (known as the Armington assumption). The model uses a nested demand structure. 
Aggregate domestic absorption by sector is allocated between domestic goods and a single 
composite import good. The latter is then allocated across region of origin to determine the 
bilateral trade flows on a sectoral basis. An analogous dual-nested structure is used to allocate 
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domestic production between domestic and export markets using constant elasticity of 
transformation functions. 
 
The model has four trade prices incorporating four separate instruments. First, producers 
receive price PE for exported goods. Second, the FOB price, WPE, includes domestic export taxes 
or subsidies. Third, the CIF price, WPM, includes the direct costs of port-to-port shipping, 
represented by the ad valorem wedge , as well as a non-monetary or frictional cost,5 represented 
by the iceberg parameter . Thus the relationship between the FOB price and the CIF price is 
given by 
 
   irrirrirrirr WPEWPM ,',,',,',,', 1   (1) 
 
where subscripts r, r', and i denote exporting region/country, importing region/country, and 
commodity, respectively. Finally, the domestic price of imports, PM, is equal to the CIF price, 
WPM, plus the ad valorem tariff (or tariff-equivalent) rate. In our model, an increase in irr ,',  represents a reduction in trade-related risk, lower administrative barriers to trade (e.g., customs 
procedures) and/or a fall in technical barrier (e.g., mutual recognition of product standards). In 
other words, trade facilitation would increase the value of irr ,', .  
Foreign capital flows (e.g., foreign direct investment: FDI) are exogenous in the current 
version. We acknowledge that endogenous treatment of FDI is very important when we discuss 
the implications of FTAs because trade and FDI are closely linked. It has been shown that 
allowing for capital to flow to countries with relatively high rates of return could significantly 
raise the gains from trade reform. In our preliminary investigation on the impact of APEC trade 
and investment liberalization, Lee and van der Mensbrugghe (2005) find that an addition of FDI 
liberalization to trade liberalization would significantly boost the gains to most of the APEC 
economies. 
 
Most of the data used in the model come from the GTAP database, version 6, which provides 
2001 data on input-output, value added, final demand, bilateral trade, tax and subsidy data for 87 
regions and 57 sectors.6 For the purpose of the present study, the database is aggregated into 10 
regions and 26 sectors as shown in Table 1. 
 
 
3.  The Baseline and Policy Scenarios 
 
3.1  The Baseline Scenario 
 
To evaluate alternative FTA scenarios in East Asia, we first establish a baseline, which shows the 
path of each economy in the absence of any FTAs over the period 2001-2015. In the baseline, 
several key variables, including GDP growth rates, population and labor supply, are 
predetermined by the exogenous assumptions. Projections of real GDP, population and labor 
supply are broadly consistent with the World Bank’s long-term forecast. We assume that the trade 
and transport margin declines by 1 percent per annum in every country. The dynamics are 
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calibrated in each country/region by imposing the assumption of a balanced growth path. This 
implies that the ratio between labor and the capital/fixed-factor bundle (in efficiency units) is held 
constant over time.7 When policy scenarios are simulated, the growth of capital is endogenously 
determined by the saving-investment relation. 
 
Several assumptions underline the calibration of productivity. Agricultural productivity is 
fixed in the baseline using results from recent empirical studies. Sectoral productivity in non-
agricultural sectors is composed of three components: a uniform economywide factor that is 
calibrated to achieve the given GDP target, a sector-specific factor related to openness, and a 
constant shifter. The sector-specific factor intended to capture openness-sensitive changes in 
productivity, i,t, is given by 
 
 
i
ti
ti
titi X
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
 



,
,
,,  (2)  
 
where Ei,t is exports of commodity i, Xi,t is output of commodity i, i,t is a shift parameter, and i is 
the elasticity of productivity with respect to openness. i,t is calibrated in the baseline scenario so 
that the trade-sensitive portion of sectoral productivity is some share of total productivity.8  
 
There are four types of taxes in the model: commodity taxes, production taxes, income taxes 
and trade taxes (consisting of tariffs and export taxes). Commodity and production taxes are held 
constant throughout the simulation period. The marginal income tax rate adjusts to maintain a 
given government budget surplus or deficit. For the final implementation of the Uruguay Round, 
the tariff and export tax rates are lowered during the 2001-2005 period. The Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing (ATC) that have phased out import quotas on textiles and apparel are also 
incorporated in the baseline. Finally, China and Taiwan’s WTO accession and the resulting 
reductions in their tariff rates are also included. 
 
3.2  Policy Scenarios 
 
To evaluate sectoral adjustments and changes in the pattern of trade resulting from prospective 
free trade agreements in East Asia, the following seven policy scenarios are considered: 
 
1) ASEAN-China FTA: Free trade among the ASEAN countries and China9  
2) ASEAN-Japan FTA: Free trade among the ASEAN countries and Japan  
3) ASEAN-Korea FTA: Free trade among the ASEAN countries and Korea  
4) China-Japan-Korea FTA: Free trade among China, Japan and Korea  
5) ASEAN+3: Free trade among the ASEAN countries, China, Japan and Korea  
6) ASEAN-EU: Free trade among the ASEAN and EU member countries  
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7) Global trade liberalization (GTL): Complete abolition of import tariffs and export 
subsidies 
 
While the likelihood of actually completing the above trade liberalization or FTAs within a 
reasonable time horizon differs significantly across scenarios, it is worth examining each of them. 
Scenario 1 is under implementation as ASEAN countries and China signed a framework 
agreement in 2002 to establish the FTA for trade in goods by 2010 for China and ASEAN-6 and 
by 2015 for newer ASEAN member states.10 An FTA between ASEAN and Japan (scenario 2) 
that excludes some agricultural products (e.g., rice and beef) was endorsed by Southeast Asian 
countries and Japan in November 2007 and expected to be officially signed sometime in 2008. An 
FTA between ASEAN and Korea (scenario 3), also excluding some agricultural products (e.g., 
rice), was signed in May 2006. The proposal for China-Japan-Korea FTA (scenario 4) has been 
considered by the governments of the three countries (Wong et al., 2004), and a joint research on 
economic cooperation among these countries has been undertaken by the Development Research 
Center of the State Council of China, the National Institute for Research Advancement of Japan, 
and the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. Although negotiations for an FTA 
among the economies of ASEAN+3 have not yet begun, we include scenario 5 because a number 
of studies have examined the possible effects of such an arrangement (e.g., Brown et al., 2003; 
Lee and Park, 2005; Tran, 2005). In addition, in May 2007 the ASEAN countries and the EU 
agreed to start negotiations on a comprehensive trade agreement. 11 Finally, we have the global 
trade liberalization (GTL) scenario so that the effects of the FTA scenarios can be compared with 
those of the global scenario. 
 
In all FTA experiments, we gradually remove bilateral tariffs and export subsidies of the 
relevant sectors among the member countries over the 2007-2012 period. We set the elasticity of 
productivity with respect to openness, i, to 0.5 in agricultural sectors and to 1.0 in all other 
sectors. We assume that frictional trade costs (e.g. administrative barriers and trade-related risk) 
would be reduced by 2.5 percent in all FTA scenarios and the GTL scenario.12 
 
 
4.  Results 
 
4.1  Effects on Welfare 
 
The welfare results for the seven policy scenarios, as deviations in equivalent variations (EV) 
from the baseline in 2015, are summarized in Table 2. The GTL scenario (scenario 7) is the most 
attractive for all countries and regions. To be realistic, however, the WTO process is fraught with 
uncertainty about the scope, depth, and timeliness of multilateral commitments to abolish trade 
barriers. Although the Doha Round started in 2001, there have been disagreements between 
developed countries and developing countries on a number of issues, particularly on the extent of 
reductions in agricultural subsidies in the United States and the EU and tariff caps. As a result, the 
negotiations of the current round have been deadlocked a number of times.13  This kind of 
uncertainty has been an important impetus to regional agreements, particularly those between 
small groups of nations who find consensus, implementation and monitoring easier. 
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In the ASEAN-China FTA (scenario 1), EV of ASEAN increases by 2.8 percent, whereas EV 
of China increases by a smaller percentage (1.1%), compared with the baseline values in 2015. 
This largely results from two factors: (1) the share of ASEAN’s exports to China is significantly 
larger than the share of China’s exports to ASEAN, and (2) the exports to output ratio is 
substantially higher for ASEAN countries. The welfare effects on non-member countries are 
negligible except for Korea and Taiwan, which experience 0.2 and 0.3 percent declines in their 
EVs. When ASEAN and Japan form an FTA (scenario 2), ASEAN’s EV increases by 1.6 percent 
while Japan’s EV increases by just 0.5 percent in 2015. Welfare of other East Asian countries 
(China, Korea, and Taiwan) declines very slightly. In the ASEAN-Korea FTA (scenario 3), the 
corresponding changes for ASEAN and Korea’s EV are 1.2 and 1.4 percent. 
 
When a free trade area is formed among China, Japan, and Korea (scenario 4), China and 
Korea are expected to accrue relatively large welfare gains (2.4% and 2.5%, respectively) while 
Japan’s welfare is expected to rise by 0.7 percent. This is largely because (1) China has relatively 
high pre-FTA tariffs,14 and (2) Korea will have preferential accesses to the large Chinese and 
Japanese markets and its exports to China and Japan, which already constitute large shares of 
Korea’s total exports, will increase dramatically. Under the trilateral FTA, China, Korea and 
Japan respectively obtain 84, 71 and 62 percent of the GTL’s benefits. Thus, the China-Japan-
Korea FTA could be a very attractive stepping stone to globalization for the three countries 
although large political obstacles must be surmounted to achieve such an FTA. 
 
Under the ASEAN+3 FTA scenario (scenario 5), the welfare of all members increases 
although the welfare gain for Japan and Korea are somewhat smaller than under the trilateral FTA. 
These small losses are more than offset by the ASEAN and China’s gains and East Asia as a 
whole is expected to gain $131.7 billion (1.6%) in 2015, compared with its $176.3 billion (2.1%) 
gain under the GTL. In other words, East Asia will be able to attain three-quarters of GTL’s 
benefits from the ASEAN+3 FTA. 
 
If free trade between ASEAN and the EU is realized (scenario 6), ASEAN is expected to 
realize a 1.0 percent gain in its welfare, which is surprisingly smaller than the gain expected from 
an FTA with China, Japan, or Korea. The EU’s welfare is predicted to increase by 1.1 percent. 
One of the reasons for a relatively small welfare gain for ASEAN is that its trade with East Asian 
countries, particularly with China, is projected to grow significantly faster than that with the EU 
during the simulation period. For example, by 2015 ASEAN’s exports are predicted to increase by 
$81 billion under the ASEAN-China FTA scenario, but they are predicted to increase by only $40 
billion under the ASEAN-EU FTA scenario (compared with the baseline exports for ASEAN). 
 
4.2  Effects on Sectoral Output 
 
While the aggregate welfare and trade results are of interest in themselves, the most useful results 
are at the industry level, where structural adjustments and resource reallocations occur in response 
to policy changes. Because sectoral interests can exert significant influence on policy negotiations, 
the sectoral results would be most important for political economy considerations. In this section 
we examine the effects of alternative policy scenarios on sectoral output. 
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Tables 3-6 summarize output adjustments for the 26 sectors in China, Japan, Korea and 
ASEAN countries under the policy scenarios in which each country/region is a participant. 
Sectoral adjustments are expressed in percent deviations from the baseline for the year 2015. They 
are large in most of the agricultural and food sectors for East Asia in general and Japan and Korea 
in particular because of high trade barriers in these two countries. 
 
China’s agricultural and food sectors expand under the China-Japan-Korea FTA and 
ASEAN+3 FTA scenarios (Table 3). In particular, the percentage increases in output of other 
crops are over 150 percent relative to the baseline in 2015 under these two scenarios although in 
absolute values, these increases are smaller than rice, other grains, vegetables and fruits, and food 
products. 
 
Among the manufacturing sectors, output of other transportation equipment increases 15-16 
percent when the ASEAN countries are included in the FTA. Output of the apparel and leather 
sectors increases moderately when Japan is an FTA member, but the increase is small relative to 
the GTL scenario because China’s exports of these products to North American and the EU are 
much larger. The motor vehicle sector contracts when Japan and Korea are FTA members, but the 
extent of contraction is relatively small compared with the GTL scenario.15 
 
Japan’s rice sector contracts significantly under all four scenarios (Table 4). The contractions 
of other agricultural and food products, particularly other grains, are much smaller under the three 
FTA scenarios than under the GTL scenario. Under the China-Japan-Korea FTA and ASEAN+3 
FTA scenarios, Japan’s textile sector expands by 19-21 percent, largely driven by sharp increases 
in its exports to China. By contrast, the apparel and leather sectors respectively contract by 7-8 
percent and 13-15 percent, caused by large increases in its imports from China and to a much 
lesser extent from increases in its imports from other member countries. Under the ASEAN+3 
FTA scenario, output of steel increases by 4 percent, about the same percentage increase as the 
GTL scenario largely because about three-quarters of Japan’s steel exports are shipped to other 
East Asian countries.  
 
A small contraction in Japan’s motor vehicle industry under the China-Japan-Korea FTA 
scenario needs to be interpreted with caution. Large increases in its exports to China and Korea 
increase the price of Japanese automobiles in our model, reducing its exports to nonmember 
countries as well as the domestic demand. However, in practice the automakers are unlikely to 
raise the price at least in the short run because they usually try to maintain the market shares. Thus, 
output of motor vehicles in Japan is likely to increase even under this scenario. 
 
Like Japan, Korea will experience large output adjustments in the agricultural sectors, rice and 
other grains in particular, under all four scenarios (Table 5). Output of vegetables and fruits and 
other crops will contract significantly under the China-Japan-Korea FTA, ASEAN+3 FTA, and 
GTL scenarios.16 
 
Among the manufacturing sectors, output of textiles, leather, petroleum products, and other 
manufactures would increase. Although the motor vehicle industry would expand under the 
ASEAN-Korea FTA and GTL scenarios, it is expected to contract under the China-Japan-Korea 
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FTA and ASEAN+3 FTA scenarios largely because Korea’s imports of motor vehicles from 
Japan increase substantially. 
 
Under the FTA scenarios in which ASEAN countries are members, the sectoral adjustments 
differ significantly across the scenarios (Table 6). For example, the textile, apparel, and leather 
industries expand by 13-29 percent under the ASEAN-EU FTA scenario, whereas these industries 
either increase only slightly or contract in the other four FTA scenarios. This is mainly because 
ASEAN countries have comparative advantage in these products over the EU, but not over China. 
In addition, the protection rates on these products in ASEAN were high relative to those in Japan 
and Korea in the base year (2001). 
 
Output of chemicals and machinery expands substantially when China is a member of the 
FTA, and output of motor vehicles and parts contracts noticeably in all scenarios except the 
ASEAN-China FTA case.  
 
4.3  Changes in the Pattern of Trade 
 
In this section we examine the effects of alternative FTA scenarios on the pattern of East Asian 
trade. Specifically, we compute the indices of revealed comparative advantage (RCA), developed 
by Balassa (1965), and correlate RCA rankings of commodities with various FTA scenarios and 
those with the global trade liberalization scenario to examine how “natural” the groupings would 
be. 
 
RCA is defined as 
 
 


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 (3)  
 
where Er,i is country (region) r’s exports of commodity i. In other words, RCA is defined as the 
share of commodity i in country r’s total exports relative to the commodity’s share in total world 
exports. When the RCA index is greater than one, commodity i is more important in country r’s 
exports than it is in total world exports, implying that the country has a comparative advantage in 
the commodity. 
 
Table 7 provides the RCA indices for the 26 sectors in China, Japan, Korea and ASEAN in 
2001. In general, the larger the RCA index for a given commodity, the higher is the ranking of the 
product by comparative advantage (Kreinin and Plummer, 1994a,b). However, the RCA index 
may be distorted by tariffs, nontariff barriers, subsidies and other policies. For example, RCA in 
Japan’s rice sector is equal to 1.87, but this number is highly distorted because rice is one of the 
least competitive sectors in Japan. 
 
In China the commodities/sectors with the five highest RCA index values in 2001 are leather 
(5.20), apparel (3.77), other manufactures (3.43), trade and transport (2.17), and textiles (1.94). In 
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Japan they are motor vehicles (2.33), machinery (1.76), electronic equipment (1.76), iron and steel 
(1.58), and other transport equipment (1.25). In Korea the commodities with high RCA rankings 
are textiles (2.69), electronic equipment (2.39), other transport equipment (1.83), petroleum 
products (1.72), and iron and steel (1.61), whereas in ASEAN they are rice (4.48), electronic 
equipment (3.07), wood products (1.69), other crops (1.53), apparel (1.49), and leather (1.44).  
 
To examine how “natural” each FTA grouping might be, we first compute the RCA indices 
under the GTL scenario for the year 2015. Second, we calculate the RCA indices for each 
member country of FTA with respect to the bloc it joins, rather than the world as a whole, for the 
six FTA scenarios in 2015. Third, we compute the Spearman rank correlation coefficients for 
China, Japan, Korea, ASEAN and the EU between each FTA scenario and the GTL scenario in 
2015.17 The results are summarized in Table 8. It should be noted that our definition of natural 
trading bloc is one where each member country has a relatively high Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient between the particular trading bloc and global trade liberalization. This should 
contrasted with a more conventional definition of natural trading partners where a pair of 
countries have similar size, GDP per capita, are neighboring, and share a common border and/or a 
common language (e.g., Frankel et al., 1995). 
 
For China and ASEAN the correlation coefficients of RCA rankings between any particular 
FTA and GTL differ considerably across the FTA scenarios. On the contrary, for Japan and Korea 
the coefficients are 0.83-0.91 and 0.71-0.85, respectively, suggesting that RCA rankings between 
any given FTA and GTL are similar for the two countries. For example, for Japan motor vehicles, 
machinery, and iron and steel are ranked in the top 3, while agricultural products and fossil fuel 
are ranked at or near the bottom of the rankings, under all three FTA scenarios in which Japan is a 
member as well as under GTL. By contrast, China has a very low coefficient between the China-
Japan-Korea FTA and GTL. This is mainly caused by large increases in China’s exports of other 
grains, other crops and fossil fuel to Japan and Korea, thereby significantly raising its RCA 
rankings of these commodities with respect to the trilateral bloc. However, China’s RCA indices 
of these commodities under GTL are at the bottom of the rankings. Thus, for China large 
increases in exports of agricultural products and energy under the China-Japan-Korea FTA are 
undesirable because they result in sectoral adjustments that are quite different from those expected 
from GTL. 
 
ASEAN has low Spearman correlation coefficients between the FTA with either China or 
Korea and GTL for two important reasons. First, electronic equipment has the highest RCA index 
among all commodity groups in ASEAN under GTL. However, its RCA ranking falls to 10-15th 
in the ASEAN-China and ASEAN-Korea FTA scenarios. Second, apparel and leather’s RCA 
indices are near the top of the rankings under GTL, but their rankings fall significantly under the 
bilateral FTA with China or Korea. 
 
Kreinin and Plummer (1994b) suggest that a natural FTA is one in which the Spearman 
correlation coefficients are high for all member countries. Among the six FTA scenarios 
considered in this study, the ASEAN-EU FTA may be considered relatively natural as the 
Spearman correlation coefficients are greater than 0.5 for both ASEAN and the EU. Among the 
five alternative East Asian FTAs, the ASEAN-Japan and the ASEAN+3 FTAs cause relatively 
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small adjustments in the rankings of industries compared with the rankings of industries under 
GTL. 
 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we have examined the effects of alternative FTA scenarios in East Asia on sectoral 
adjustments and the pattern of trade. Our findings indicate that the China-Japan-Korea FTA and 
the ASEAN+3 FTA would bring about relatively large welfare gains to all member countries. 
However, a tradeoff exists between welfare gains and costs associated with structural adjustments. 
For China, a low Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the China-Japan-Korea FTA and 
global trade liberalization suggests that it would need to undergo considerable structural 
adjustments under the trilateral FTA. The average correlation coefficient of the member countries’ 
RCA rankings between a particular FTA and GTL is significantly greater for the ASEAN-Japan 
and the ASEAN+3 FTAs. Thus, it appears that the ASEAN+3 FTA would be the most attractive 
FTA among the alternative FTAs considered in this study, with relatively large welfare gains and 
small structural adjustments. 
 
 
Endnotes
 
1. See Kawai (2005), Feridhanusetyawan (2005), Lee and Park (2005), and Sally (2007) for 
more detailed discussion on the proliferation of FTAs in East Asia. 
2. Proponents for regional integration argue that FTAs encourage member countries to liberalize 
beyond the level committed by multilateral negotiations and that they are an effective way to 
promote economic integration (e.g., Kahler, 1995; Dee, 2007). In addition, FTAs are likely to 
induce dynamic effects that might contribute to member countries’ growth through the 
accumulation of physical and human capital, productivity growth, and accelerated domestic 
reforms (e.g., Ethier, 1998; Fukase and Winters, 2003). Opponents worry that the proliferation 
of FTAs is likely to undermine the multilateral trading system and that beneficiaries of FTAs 
might form a political lobby to deter further multilateral liberalization (e.g., Bhagwati, 1995; 
Srinivasan, 1998a, 1998b; Panagariya, 1999a). 
3. See, for example, Panagariya (1999b), Schiff and Winters (2003), and Lloyd and MacLaren 
(2004) for reviews on this issue. 
4. The assumption of constant returns to scale is a simplification and generally biases downwards 
the gains from trade reform because expansion of trade provides scale efficiencies. The 
introduction of scale economies raises a number of important issues, each of which could 
significantly modify the results, but we prefer to leave out of the current study. They include 
the lack of data on the minimum efficient scale and the specification of market structure (e.g., 
Cournot versus Bertrand competition), the number of firms, conjectural variations, and 
whether there is free entry and exit. 
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5. This type of cost is referred to as ‘iceberg’ transport cost, developed by Samuelson (1952) 
based on a concept developed earlier by von Thünen. More recently, these have been used in 
work by Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999). 
6. Dimaranan (2006) gives detailed descriptions of the GTAP database, version 6. 
7. This involves computing in each period a measure of Harrod-neutral technical progress in the 
capital/fixed-factor bundle as a residual, given that the growth of the labor force (in efficiency 
units) is pre-determined. This is a standard calibration procedure in dynamic CGE modeling. 
8. Three main channels have been identified linking openness with productivity: imports of 
technology-laden intermediate inputs (for example fertilizers in agriculture), imports of capital 
goods, and export market penetration (with the requirement to produce to a higher standard 
than at home to be able to penetrate new markets; expanding foreign markets can also lead to 
scale economies). Much empirical work is ongoing trying to identify the extent to which each 
one of these channels operates. At a macro level, there are to some extent observationally 
equivalent to the extent that current account balances are more or less exogenous. de Melo and 
Robinson (1990) and Dessus et al. (1999) take an approach similar to ours. Das et al. (2001) 
have explored some firm-level characteristics of export supply response.  
9. Throughout the paper Hong Kong is included in China, as indicated in Table 1. 
10. ASEAN-6 refers to the five original ASEAN members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand) plus Brunei. Newer ASEAN member states are Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, and Vietnam. 
11. Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Nicolas (2007) examine the economic feasibility of an ASEAN-
EU FTA. 
12. Keuschnigg and Kohler (2002) and Madsen and Sorensen (2002) use a 5 percent reduction in 
real costs of trade between the EU-15 and Central and East European countries. We use a 
smaller reduction in these costs because the reductions in technical barriers are expected to be 
negligible for FTAs in East Asia as well as for GTL compared with EU enlargement. 
13. See, for example, Langhammer (2004) for causes and triggers of the setback at the WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Cancún in September 2003. 
14. The countries with high pre-FTA tariffs generally gain proportionally more than those with 
low tariffs because of larger gains to their consumers resulting from greater reductions in 
import prices. 
15. Under the China-Japan-Korea FTA and ASEAN+3 FTA scenarios, large increases in China’s 
imports of motor vehicles from Japan and Korea are partially offset by reductions in its 
imports from North America and the EU. 
16. In practice, however, Japan and Korea are extremely unlikely to remove tariffs on imports of 
rice, wheat, and a number of other agricultural products. Thus, the magnitudes of sectoral 
adjustments are expected to be smaller than those reported in Tables 3-6. Lee et al. (2004) 
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provide several FTA scenarios where trade barriers on agricultural products and processed food 
are assumed to remain fixed. They confirm that welfare gains to the FTA member countries 
become significantly smaller in the absence of agricultural liberalization. 
17. We also computed the Spearman rank correlation coefficients between each FTA scenario and 
the baseline scenario in 2015 for these countries, but the results were qualitatively similar. 
This is because we assume partial trade liberalization on imports of all products from all 
trading partners in the baseline. 
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Table 1.  Regional and Sectoral Aggregation 
 
A.  Regional aggregation     
Country/region Corresponding economies/regions in the GTAP database    
China China and Hong Kong 
Japan Japan 
Korea Korea 
Taiwan Taiwan 
ASEAN Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, rest of  
 Southeast Asia 
Australasia Australia and New Zealand 
North America United States, Canada, Mexico 
Latin America Central America and the Caribbean, South America 
EU Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain,  
 Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
 plus the new member countries since 2004 
Rest of world All the other economies/regions   
 
B.  Sectoral aggregation     
Sector Corresponding commodities/sectors in the GTAP database    
Rice Paddy rice, processed rice 
Other grains Wheat, cereal grains nec 
Vegetables and fruits Vegetables and fruits 
Other crops Oil seeds, sugar cane and sugar beet, plant-based fibers, crops nec 
Livestock Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, animal products nec  
Natural resources forestry, minerals 
Fossil fuel Coal, oil, gas 
Food products Fishing, food products, beverages and tobacco products 
Textiles Textiles 
Apparel Wearing apparel 
Leather Leather products 
Wood products Wood products 
Paper products Paper products and publishing 
Petroleum products Petroleum and coal products 
Chemical products Chemical, rubber and plastic products 
Mineral products Non-metallic mineral products 
Iron and steel Iron and steel 
Nonferrous metal Nonferrous metal 
Metal products Fabricated metal products 
Machinery Machinery and equipment 
Electronic equipment Electronic equipment 
Motor vehicles Motor vehicles and parts 
Other transport equip. Other transportation equipment 
Other manufactures Manufactures nec 
Trade and transport Trade, sea transport, air transport, transport nec 
Services Construction, public utilities, communication, financial services,  
 other services    
Source: GTAP database, version 6. 
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Table 2.  Effects on Welfare (Deviations in Equivalent Variations from the Baseline in 2015) 
    
 Scenario       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Country/region ASEAN- ASEAN- ASEAN- China- ASEAN ASEAN- GTL 
 China Japan Korea Japan-Korea plus 3 EU    A.  Absolute deviations (US$ billion in 2001 prices) 
China 26.8 -2.9 -2.5 58.7 64.9 -2.3 69.7 
Japan -1.7 19.7 -0.9 29.8 29.7 -0.5 48.2 
Korea -1.1 -0.6 9.1 16.8 16.2 -0.6 23.7 
Taiwan -1.1 -0.7 -0.4 -1.5 -2.6 -0.5 12.1 
ASEAN 27.2 15.3 11.8 -3.8 23.5 9.9 22.6 
Australia/New Zealand -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2 11.4 
North America -0.3 -0.9 -0.4 -1.8 -2.8 -0.3 130.8 
Latin America 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -1.1 -1.3 -0.9 36.1 
EU -1.9 -0.8 -0.4 -0.7 -2.5 88.0 76.2 
Rest of the world -1.8 -1.6 -1.6 -2.0 -4.5 -7.1 108.1  
East Asia total 50.0 30.8 17.1 100.0 131.7 6.0 176.3 
World total 45.7 26.8 13.9 93.8 119.7 85.5 538.8 
 
B.  Percent deviations 
China 1.1 -0.1 -0.1 2.4 2.7 -0.1 2.9 
Japan 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.0 1.2 
Korea -0.2 -0.1 1.4 2.5 2.4 -0.1 3.5 
Taiwan -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.1 2.9 
ASEAN 2.8 1.6 1.2 -0.4 2.5 1.0 2.4 
Australia/New Zealand 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 2.3 
North America 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 
Latin America 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 2.2 
EU 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.0 
Rest of the world 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 2.8  
East Asia total 0.6 0.4 0.2 1.2 1.6 0.1 2.1 
World total 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.5    
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Table 3.  China’s Sectoral Output Adjustments under Alternative Scenarios (Percent Deviations 
from the Baseline for the Year 2015) 
    
 Scenario       (1) (4) (5) (7) 
Commodity/sector ASEAN- China- ASEAN GTL 
 China Japan-Korea plus 3    Rice 0.4 26.7 19.8 17.1 
Other grains 0.3 27.0 26.7 -50.9 
Vegetables and fruits 0.2 5.5 5.3 4.9 
Other crops -0.2 156.9 157.6 2.4 
Livestock 0.8 3.1 3.3 5.4 
Natural resources -0.4 -0.9 -1.1 -2.5 
Fossil fuel 0.3 0.2 0.4 -4.4 
Food products 1.4 7.0 7.3 3.9 
Textiles 0.9 -0.6 -0.2 11.4 
Apparel -0.2 5.0 3.9 20.7 
Leather 2.4 1.4 3.0 17.9 
Wood products -1.5 0.8 -0.7 1.9 
Paper products 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 
Petroleum products 2.4 -1.0 1.2 -3.2 
Chemical products -2.2 -0.9 -2.7 -3.1 
Mineral products 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 0.1 
Iron and steel 0.7 -2.0 -1.4 -3.5 
Nonferrous metal 0.1 -2.1 -2.0 -6.5 
Metal products 0.3 -0.7 -0.5 1.8 
Machinery 0.4 -1.2 -1.0 -2.6 
Electronic equipment 2.0 1.2 1.9 0.9 
Motor vehicles 2.0 -4.4 -4.8 -13.9 
Other transport equip. 16.0 0.3 15.3 13.9 
Other manufactures -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 0.0 
Trade and transport 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Services 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2    
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Table 4.  Japan’s Sectoral Output Adjustments under Alternative Scenarios (Percent Deviations 
from the Baseline for the Year 2015) 
    
 Scenario       (2) (4) (5) (7) 
Commodity/sector ASEAN- China- ASEAN GTL 
 Japan Japan-Korea plus 3    Rice -53.2 -58.0 -58.5 -65.7 
Other grains 0.8 -33.0 -34.1 -87.3 
Vegetables and fruits 0.5 -0.1 -0.8 -5.6 
Other crops 0.3 -2.1 -2.7 -5.8 
Livestock -0.9 2.5 0.8 -6.4 
Natural resources -0.2 -1.0 -0.2 -0.2 
Fossil fuel -2.2 -3.7 -3.8 -7.9 
Food products -2.4 -0.5 -2.9 -14.5 
Textiles 2.9 20.6 18.8 10.2 
Apparel -0.7 -7.8 -7.4 -7.1 
Leather -3.8 -12.7 -14.8 -22.0 
Wood products -1.1 -2.6 -2.2 -0.9 
Paper products 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 
Petroleum products 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -3.5 
Chemical products 0.6 1.9 1.4 1.1 
Mineral products 0.5 2.3 2.5 2.3 
Iron and steel 3.1 1.6 4.0 3.9 
Nonferrous metal 1.3 1.8 2.9 -0.9 
Metal products 1.1 0.3 1.2 1.8 
Machinery -0.1 2.5 2.2 0.9 
Electronic equipment -0.8 -1.4 -2.5 -0.7 
Motor vehicles 4.4 -1.3 2.2 14.0 
Other transport equip. 0.8 -3.5 -5.0 7.6 
Other manufactures 0.7 -0.7 0.2 0.1 
Trade and transport 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.4 
Services 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4    
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Table 5.  Korea’s Sectoral Output Adjustments under Alternative Scenarios (Percent Deviations 
from the Baseline for the Year 2015) 
    
 Scenario       (3) (4) (5) (7) 
Commodity/sector ASEAN- China- ASEAN GTL 
 Korea Japan-Korea plus 3    Rice -41.0 -54.8 -55.1 -55.7 
Other grains -19.7 -47.3 -49.8 -91.9 
Vegetables and fruits 4.5 -20.0 -19.7 -17.3 
Other crops  7.5 -30.9 -30.2 -68.4 
Livestock 20.0 36.7 35.0 31.1 
Natural resources -4.2 -8.1 -7.9 -14.8 
Fossil fuel -2.9 -0.3 -1.9 -14.4 
Food products 14.6 22.5 20.8 16.1 
Textiles 5.6 21.0 23.0 25.8 
Apparel -1.4 5.0 5.6 4.6 
Leather 25.5 100.2 90.4 68.4 
Wood products -5.7 -3.3 -5.9 -4.3 
Paper products -2.0 1.6 0.6 -3.6 
Petroleum products 2.8 17.0 14.0 17.6 
Chemical products -0.8 6.1 2.1 -1.8 
Mineral products -2.6 -1.4 -2.1 -7.5 
Iron and steel 0.3 -3.7 -2.3 -5.7 
Nonferrous metal 0.3 -1.4 0.6 -10.3 
Metal products -0.4 -1.8 -1.6 -2.4 
Machinery -3.3 -4.9 -5.1 -8.3 
Electronic equipment -3.8 -0.6 -2.7 -3.4 
Motor vehicles 21.3 -1.1 11.7 30.0 
Other transport equip. 6.4 -12.2 -15.5 22.3 
Other manufactures 2.7 10.5 12.7 2.8 
Trade and transport 0.7 1.0 1.1 3.0 
Services -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2     
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Table 6.  ASEAN’s Sectoral Output Adjustments under Alternative Scenarios (Percent Deviations 
from the Baseline for the Year 2015) 
    
 Scenario       (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) 
Commodity/sector ASEAN- ASEAN- ASEAN- ASEAN ASEAN- GTL 
 China Japan Korea plus 3 EU    Rice -1.2 24.7 7.1 7.1 7.5 13.9 
Other grains -10.5 -0.5  30.1 -2.6 -5.4 -16.2 
Vegetables and fruits 6.7 -3.5 -3.8 3.6 -3.1 3.6 
Other crops 11.1 9.3 9.1 9.4 13.4 -2.2 
Livestock 1.6 4.4 0.9 3.9 3.2 9.7 
Natural resources -5.0 -3.3 -2.3 -3.8 -4.7 -8.2 
Fossil fuel -3.7 -1.5 -0.2 -2.1 -3.5 -6.0 
Food products 3.0 11.7 3.9 9.3 7.4 21.1 
Textiles -0.8 0.3 0.6 -4.8 13.0 6.5 
Apparel -1.1 3.3 1.9 2.3 15.3 24.3 
Leather -9.7 0.9 -2.8 -8.2 29.0 7.5 
Wood products -7.1 -1.6 -2.8 -2.2 -4.6 -5.0 
Paper products -1.3 -2.1 -0.6 -2.2 -3.2 -3.4 
Petroleum products 2.0 0.9 0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 
Chemical products 22.8 -0.8 2.1 17.7 0.2 12.0 
Mineral products 0.8 -2.4 0.9 -0.8 -2.4 -1.7 
Iron and steel 0.9 -7.4 -0.2 -7.2 -4.1 -10.8 
Nonferrous metal -3.2 -3.6 -1.4 -4.0 -7.0 -13.7 
Metal products 0.4 -0.6 1.9 -1.6 -1.4 -3.8 
Machinery 11.2 4.6 5.4 10.8 0.6 5.1 
Electronic equipment 1.4 -0.5 -0.7 1.7 -4.1 -4.9 
Motor vehicles 9.2 -13.7 -7.9 -18.4 -6.0 -20.4 
Other transport equip. -8.2 11.3 12.4 -6.0 12.0 -9.3 
Other manufactures -3.8 -1.4 -0.8 -3.2 -0.6 -7.8 
Trade and transport -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 
Services -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7    
 
 
 Lee and van der Mensbrugghe 23
 
Table 7.  Revealed Comparative Advantage Indices for China, Japan, Korea and ASEAN in 2001 
    
Commodity/sector China Japan Korea ASEAN    Rice 1.21 1.87 0.09 4.48 
Other grains 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.06 
Vegetables and fruits 0.65 0.01 0.23 0.66 
Other crops 0.46 0.04 0.17 1.53 
Livestock 1.05 0.09 0.08 0.35 
Natural resources 0.35 0.05 0.04 1.39 
Fossil fuel 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.87 
Food products 0.44 0.12 0.26 1.18 
Textiles 1.94 0.72 2.69 0.97 
Apparel 3.77 0.05 0.84 1.49 
Leather 5.20 0.05 0.99 1.44 
Wood products 1.46 0.06 0.12 1.69 
Paper products 0.40 0.27 0.57 0.64 
Petroleum products 0.47 0.15 1.72 1.01 
Chemical products 0.52 0.91 1.01 0.69 
Mineral products 1.12 0.97 0.54 0.69 
Iron and steel 0.32 1.58 1.61 0.27 
Nonferrous metal 0.39 0.59 0.69 0.55 
Metal products 1.37 0.75 0.98 0.45 
Machinery 0.86 1.76 0.78 0.58 
Electronic equipment 1.26 1.76 2.39 3.07 
Motor vehicles 0.07 2.33 1.15 0.11 
Other transport equip. 0.42 1.25 1.83 0.24 
Other manufactures 3.43 0.71 0.58 0.75 
Trade and transport 2.17 0.56 0.55 0.80 
Services 0.46 0.43 0.56 0.77    
Source: GTAP database, version 6. 
 
 
 
Table 8.  Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients between Each FTA Scenario and Global Trade 
Liberalization in 2015 
    
 Scenario       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Country/region ASEAN- ASEAN- ASEAN- China- ASEAN ASEAN-
 China Japan Korea Japan-Korea plus 3 EU    China 0.60 –   –   0.04 0.54 –   
Japan –   0.91 –   0.83 0.86 –   
Korea –   –   0.85 0.71 0.82 –   
ASEAN 0.24 0.45 0.21 –   0.41 0.77 
EU –   –   –   –   –   0.56   
 
